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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NET-METERING AGREEMENTS: SEEKING
TO AVOID CAPTURE IN THE WESTERN DISTRICT
Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Solar energy is the most abundant energy resource available on
earth, and the demand for it is at an all-time high in the United States.2
However, the cost of producing solar electricity is relatively high
compared to the costs of producing electricity by burning coal or nuclear
fission.3 To respond to the increased demand, federal and state
governments have adopted programs to offset the higher costs of solar
production.4 Net-metering agreements between utility companies and
residents with solar panels allow those residents to receive credit on their
utility bills for energy pushed back into the utility company’s grid. Netmetering agreements are one way to keep costs down because residential

Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823 (2015).
Erin R. Pierce, Top 6 Things You Didn’t Know About Solar Energy, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY (June 22, 2012), http://energy.gov/articles/top-6-things-you-didnt-know-aboutsolar-energy.
3
E.g., Kevin Karges, Note, Net Metering: Do Non-Solar Homeowners and Utility
Companies Have a Legitimate Gripe?, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1017 (2014).
4
Id.
1
2

217

solar energy requires minimal government oversight and public
investment.5
However, said government oversight may cause problems because
the government and its agencies should be acting impartially when
regulating the utility industry and net-metering agreements. So, when
disputes arise in courts, judges will closely examine each party’s
relationship with the agency and will want to avoid ruling favorably for a
party which already has a close relationship with an agency. Sometimes
government agencies develop too close of a relationship with an industry,
causing the government agency to no longer work for public interest.6
Agency “capture” occurs when an agency prioritizes its regulated
industry’s interests over public interest.
As net metering is a relatively new practice, there is little case law
on point to guide counsel and judges when disputes arise between
consumers and a utility company. These types of net-metering disputes
could potentially affect all utility consumers because higher costs for the
utility companies will be passed on to its consumers. Therefore, when an
Id. at 1019.
See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 31 (2013).
5
6
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agency has the power to make a unilateral decision which would favor one
party, the decision could problematically lead to agency capture and
overreach unless proper safeguards like judicial review are implemented.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2008, the Missouri legislature passed the Renewable Energy
Standard,7 a statutory scheme designed to promote renewable energy
sources among consumers and producers.8 Section 393.1030.3, as part of
the Solar Energy Rebate Program (“Rebate Program”), requires all electric
utilities to “make available to its retail customers a solar rebate for new or
expanded solar electric systems sited on customers’ premises.”9 The
Renewable Energy Standard gives the Missouri Public Service
Commission (“the Commission”) the authority to make any rules
necessary to enforce the Renewable Energy Standard.10
Accordingly, the Commission enacted a regulation which requires
electric utility companies to make a rebate available for consumers who
own or lease solar-generated power equipment interconnected with the
MO. REV. STAT. § 393.1020 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 824.
9
MO. REV. STAT. § 393.1030.3 (Cum. Supp. 2013). Some electric utilities are exempt
from this provision. Those exemptions are contained in § 393.1050.
10
§ 393.1030.2.
7
8
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utility’s system.11 As part of the interconnection Rebate Program, the
Commission also requires consumers and utilities to enter into an
Interconnection Agreement and lay out the terms of the Agreement in a
form.12 The Commission’s Agreement form contains a dispute resolution
provision.13
Pursuant to the Renewable Energy Standard and the Rebate
Program, Kansas City Power & Light (“Utility Company”) advertised
solar rebates on its website, soliciting its customers to participate.14 On its
website, the Utility Company also listed approved installers of the solarpower systems, one of which was United States Solar.15 The Utility
Company’s forms contained a Net-Metering Agreement, which mirrored

MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240-20.100(4) (2016).
Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 825. “If the electric utility so chooses, it may allow customers to
apply electronically through the electric utility’s website. The interconnection agreement
on the electric utility’s website shall substantially be the same as the interconnection
agreement included herein.” Id. at 825 (citing MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–
20.065(9) (2016)).
13
Id. The language of the provision provides: “If any disagreements between the
Customer . . . and [Utility] arise that cannot be resolved through normal negotiations
between them, the disagreements may be brought to the [Commission] by either party,
through an informal or formal complaint.” MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240-20.065
(D)(8) (2016).
14
Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 825.
15
Id.
11
12
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the language of Commission’s Agreement form, including a dispute
resolution provision.16
Richard Sharp and five other consumers were participants in the
rebate program, and all were so dissatisfied with the solar-power systems’
quality and performance that they brought a class action against the utility
company, the installer, and two individual company owners.17 The
Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and violation of
the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.18 The Utility Company filed a
Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Stay Proceedings and Compel
Arbitration because the Agreement containing the dispute resolution
provision was a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. 19 Plaintiffs
filed a Supplemental Brief in Opposition alleging the installer had
fraudulently induced the Plaintiffs into signing a blank iPad screen, and
the signatures were later “copied and/or forged” onto the Net-Metering
Agreement.20 Plaintiffs claimed they never received any written

Id.
Appellants’ Brief at 1, Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823 (2015)
(No. 13BU-CV03671), 2014 WL 4659592 at *1.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
16
17
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documents21 and “never . . . could have seen any agreement that
Defendants now allege serve as the basis of Defendants’ present
motions.”22 The trial court allowed the Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended
Petition for Damages, but acknowledged that Missouri Courts tend to
favor arbitration.23
The trial court, the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, was
ultimately not persuaded that the Plaintiffs agreed to the Net-Metering
Agreement, including the dispute resolution provision, because “a person
who claims never to have seen nor signed a contract [should not] be bound
by the terms therein.”24 The trial court thereby found that the consumers
had not signed the contracts containing the dispute resolution provision.25
Utility Company appealed the trial court’s decision, and the Court of
Appeals for the Western District of Missouri held the dispute resolution

21
Brief for the Respondents at 4, Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823
(2015) (No. 13BU-CV03671), 2014 WL 5286452, at *4.
22
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 17, at 4.
23
Sharp v. KCE&L, LLC, No. 13BU-VC03671, 2014 WL 5502554, at *1 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 27, 2014).
24
Id. at *2.
25
Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
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provision was not an arbitration agreement, affirming the trial court’s
decision.26
The appellate court held de novo that the trial court had properly
denied Utility Company’s motion to stay proceedings and compel
arbitration.27 In making this decision, the appellate court looked to three
factors: (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists; (2) whether the
dispute falls within the scope of the agreement; and (3) whether applicable
contract principles subject the agreement to revocation.28 When a dispute
resolution provision is not specific as to the type of dispute resolution,
then the fact finder may not necessarily hold the provision is an agreement
to arbitrate. Although, the provision need not use the express term
“arbitration”29 for the fact finder to determine an arbitration agreement
exists between the parties. However, without an agreement to arbitrate, a
party cannot compel arbitration.30

Id. at 824, 828.
Id. at 826.
28
Id. (citing Baier v. Darden Rests., 420 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)).
29
Id. at 827.
30
Id. at 829-30.
26
27
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.
The Commission’s limited jurisdiction and the general
preference for arbitration where parties have agreed to it
This case is important because it falls within a relatively
undeveloped area of Missouri law, specifically what role the Commission
has in disputes arising from net-metering agreements between a utility
company and a consumer. Net-metering agreements have been used
increasingly between utility companies and consumers for renewable
energy, and the Commission, not the Utility Company, drafted the terms
for the Agreement between the parties.31
Disputes between consumers and utility companies are not new,
but only courts can construe and enforce contracts. In 1957, the Kansas
City Court of Appeals reiterated the Commission’s limited jurisdiction in
Katz v. Kan. City Power & Light.32 There, a consumer sued the Utility
Company to recover a refund allegedly due under the terms of the contract
between the two parties,33 but the Utility Company wanted the issue

Id. at 825.
Katz v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 303 S.W.2d 672, 679 (1957) (citing State ex rel,
Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. Buzard, 168 S.W.2d 1044, 1046 (Mo. 1943)).
33
Id. at 680.
31
32
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before the Commission, not the court.34 The Commission only has powers
statutes confer upon it35 and cannot construe or enforce contracts.36
Therefore, the circuit court properly had jurisdiction over the issues in the
dispute, not the Commission.37
In Sharp, the Utility Company cites to AMF38 as persuasive
authority for courts’ strong preference for arbitration. In AMF, competitor
manufacturers agreed to bring their disputes in the form of nonbinding
arbitration.39 A dispute arose, and the court found the dispute subject to
the agreement for nonbinding arbitration and compelled arbitration. 40 In
the case at bar, Utility Company lifts a sentence out of the AMF opinion in
its reply brief: “If the parties have agreed to submit a dispute for a decision
by a third party, they have agreed to arbitration.”41 However, in context of

Id. at 678.
Id. at 679 (citing State ex rel. Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. Buzard, 168 S.W.2d
1044, 1046 (Mo. 1943)).
36
Id. (citing State ex rel. Washington Univ. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 272 S.W. 971, 972
(Mo. 1925)).
37
Id. at 680.
38
See generally AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
39
Id. at 458. The agreement provides: “Both parties agree to submit any controversy
which they may have . . . to such advisory third party for the rendition of an advisory
opinion. Such opinion shall not be binding upon the parties . . . The parties agree that the
National Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business is agreeable to each as
the advisory third party.” Id. at 459.
40
Id. at 463.
41
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 15, Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823
34
35
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the AMF opinion, this sentence is part of dicta discussing arbitration in
general, not the manufacturers’ dispute.42
Further, Wolsey provides relevant background on the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”).43 The parties’ contract contained a dispute
resolution provision,44 and the district court assumed the parties’ dispute
resolution provision referred to arbitration.45 The Ninth Circuit found “no
magic words such as ‘arbitrate’ or ‘binding arbitration’ or ‘final dispute
resolution’ are needed to arbitrate.”46 “The FAA was designed to overrule
the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate,”
and “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.”47 The court decided to compel
arbitration.48

(Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (WD 77444), 2014 WL 5911478, at *15 (citing AMF Inc., 621 F.
Supp. at 460).
42
AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. at 460.
43
Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998).
44
Id. at 1209. The agreement language says that “all controversies, disputes or claims . . .
shall be submitted for non-binding arbitration to . . . the American Arbitration
Association on demand of either party.” Id.
45
Id. at 1213 n.3.
46
Id. at 1208.
47
Id. at 1209 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)
and Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
48
Wolsey Ltd., 144 F.3d at 1213.
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More recently, the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled on compelling
arbitration in Triarch Industries, Inc. v. Crabtree.49 The policy favoring
arbitration regards the parties’ intent as evidenced by their agreement.50
The ordinary meaning of the contract’s terms expresses the parties’
intent,51 and where the contract is not ambiguous, the court will determine
the parties’ intent from the four corners of the contract. 52 So, “while courts
look favorably upon clauses entitling a party to arbitration, this does not
mean that a court will . . . read a right to arbitrate into a contract where the
contract does not provide such a right.”53 Therefore, a party cannot be
compelled to arbitrate unless that party has agreed to it in the contract.54
B.

The Renewable Energy Standard

In November 2008, Missouri voters approved the Renewable
Energy Standard, a statutory scheme designed to encourage the use of

See generally Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772 (Mo. 2005).
Id. at 776 (quoting Keymer v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc. 169 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir.
1999)).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 777 n.7 (citing Eisenberg v. Redd, 38 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 2001)).
53
Id. at 777 (citing AJM Packaging Corp. v. Crossland Const. Co., Inc., 962 S.W.2d 906,
911 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
54
E.g., Kan. City Urology v. United Healthcare Serv., 261 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008).
49
50
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renewable energy sources.55 The scheme requires investor-owned utilities
to offer rebates to encourage the use of renewable energy by meeting
fifteen percent of the company’s annual retail sales by 2021. 56 In June
2014, the rebates would decrease annually until they cease on June 30,
2020.57 The rebate decrease incentivizes consumers to implement
renewable energy technology sooner rather than later.58 The statute gives
the Commission authority to enforce the statutes,59 and the Commission
drafted the interconnection net-metering Agreement at issue in Sharp.60
Utility companies must use interconnection agreements “substantially the
same” as the interconnection agreement the Commission drafted.61
Net-metering agreements, like the Agreement between the Utility
Company and the consumers, are used widely as part of renewable energy
efforts.62 Net-metering agreements encourage solar installations because
55
Renewable Energy Standard, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY STANDARD (last
visited Nov. 21, 2016), http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/2622.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
MO. REV. STAT. § 393.1020 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
60
Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
61
MO. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 240-20.065(9)(A) (2015).
62
Specifically, forty-three states use net-metering agreements for solar energy
transactions between consumers and utility companies. E.g. Kayci G. Hines, Solar Shift:
An Analysis of the Federal Income Tax Issues Associated with the Residential Value of
Solar Tariff, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 388, 390 (2015).
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households with solar panels can spin their electric meters backwards if
they generate enough energy to push power back into the utility
company’s energy grid.63 If the home produces enough energy to send
power to the grid, the utility company purchases the electricity for a credit
on the consumer’s monthly bill,64 banking credit for the consumers.65
Despite these benefits, solar panel systems are expensive, and their
continued viability may depend on government-mandated incentives and
rebates.66
C.
Contractual disputes before the Commission and in
Missouri, generally
Later, the Commission itself determined it could not interpret a
contractual dispute between a utility company and a consumer in Shawnee
Bend Dev. Co. v. Lake Region Water & Sewer Co.67 The parties’ contract
contained a conditional provision for arbitration, but the Commission

Kevin Karges, Net Metering: Do Non-Solar Homeowners and Utility Companies Have
a Legitimate Gripe?, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1017, 1018 (2014).
64
Id.
65
Alexander D. White, Compromise in Colorado: Solar Net Metering and the Case for
“Renewable Avoided Cost”, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2015).
66
Id. at 1098-99.
67
Shawnee Bend Dev. Co. v. Lake Region Water & Sewer Co., No. 2009 WL 762536, at
*1-2 (Mo. P.S.C. 2009).
63
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could not determine whether that condition had been met. 68 The
Commission cannot interpret contracts, including whether the contractual
condition had been met.69 The Commission only has authority to arbitrate
when both parties have agreed in writing to submit the particular dispute
to arbitration before it.70
In Sharp, the Utility Company cites to MFA, Inc. v. HLW Builders,
Inc.,71 which discusses mandatory arbitration and permissive arbitration.72
However, the MFA opinion relies on a case which states deliberately using
the word “may” instead of “shall” shows “the parties’ intent to make
arbitration permissive” and discretionary.73 The MFA opinion relies on
Maloney-Rafaie,74 even though the language of the MFA agreement is

Id.
Id. at *2.
70
Id. at *1.
71
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 17, at 9, 26; see also MFA, Inc. v. HLW Builders, Inc.,
303 S.W.3d 620, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
72
MFA, Inc., 303 S.W.3d at 623-24.
73
DiCesare-Bentley v. City of New London, 1990 WL 283866, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Aug. 3, 1990).
74
Maloney-Refaie v. Bridge at Sch., Inc., 958 A.2d 871, 884 (Del. Ch. 2008). In
Maloney-Rafaie, an arbitration clause in an employment agreement contained the
language: “Any controversy, claim or dispute arising from or relating to this Agreement .
. . upon mutual agreement of the parties, shall be resolved in accordance with the
National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes of the American Arbitration
Association . . .” Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
68
69

230

“may” and the language of the Maloney agreement is “shall.”75 In Sharp,
the Utility Company argued that the word “may” in the contract “grants
one side a right to pursue arbitration if it wished[,] and mandatory
arbitration is required when one side so requests.”76 Essentially, the Utility
Company argued that the optional remedy turns into a compulsory
procedure once one party decides to ask for the remedy of arbitration.77
However, it is incorrect and illogical to require a party who agreed to a
provision containing the words “may be brought” to mandatory arbitration
because the provision could have said “shall be brought” and does not.78
Further, arbitration contracts must be proven.79 The party asserting
the existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration contract bears the
burden of proving that proposition.80 Elements of a valid contract are
offer, acceptance, and bargained for consideration. All three elements

Wes Dagestad, Student Contribution: Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Sharp – iPad
Signatures Leave Courts Reconstructing the Mona Lisa on an “Etch-A-Sketch”, PROF.
ROYCE DE ROHAN BARONDES: CASUAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS &
BUSINESS ENTITIES, (Mar. 4, 2015) http://missouri-k.com/?page_id=818.
76
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 17, at *26 (citing Maloney-Refaie, 958 A.2d at 884).
77
Id.
78
Dagestad, supra note 75.
79
Baier v. Darden Rest., 420 S.W.3d 733, 737-38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Collins v.
Swope, 605 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
80
Id. at 737.
75
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must be proven to establish an arbitration contract.81 Additionally, mutual
assent must occur at the time of the contract, not later. 82 In Baier, the
Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri found a former
employee was not bound to arbitrate her dispute with her former
employer.83 Without the employer’s signature on certain portions of the
contract, the defendants failed to establish a valid arbitration contract.84
Without a signature, the party claiming a contract was formed must
present other evidence to establish assent to abide by the agreement’s
terms.85
Lastly, the circuit court used the reasoning in Baier to solidify that
offer and acceptance require a meeting of the minds and assenting to the

Id. at 737-38 (citing Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo.
banc 1988)).
82
Id. at 738 (citing Kunzie v. Jack-In-The-Box, Inc., 330 S.W.3d 476, 483 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010)).
83
Id. at 733.
84
Id. at 741. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District affirmed the trial
court’s finding that the employer and employee did not mutually assent to the terms of
the dispute resolution agreement, therefore the employer failed to establish the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement. Id. at 738. There were two signature lines on the form—
one for the employer and one for the employee. Id. at 735. Since the employer drafted the
contract, the trial court determined that the employer intended both the employee and
employer’s management to sign or initial each line. Id. at 739. The employer’s signature
line was actually left blank. Id. at 735. An absence of an offeror’s signature presents a
fact question requiring the trial court to determine the offeror’s intent. Id. at 739. Thus,
the employer could not compel arbitration. Id.
85
Id. at 739.
81
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same thing in the same sense at the same time.86 The case was tried
without a jury, and Judge Judah was unpersuaded by the argument that a
person who claims never to have seen nor signed a contract is required to
be bound by its terms.87 The consumers could not have agreed to arbitrate
disputes with Utility Company if they had not seen the contract’s terms
when they signed the iPad.88 Utility Company argued on appeal the
preference for arbitration and applicable contract principles require the
consumers be compelled to arbitration.89
IV. INSTANT DECISION
After the trial court denied the Utility Company’s motion to
compel arbitration, the Utility Company argued on appeal the trial “court
erred because the consumers’ complaints were within the scope of the . . .
valid and enforceable dispute resolution provision,” and the provision
embodied an agreement to arbitrate before the Commission.90 The court
held the trial court properly denied the Utility Company’s motion because

Sharp v. KCE&L, LLC, 2014 WL 5502554, at *2 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2014).
Id.
88
Id.
89
Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 825-26.
90
Id. at 826.
86
87
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the dispute resolution provision was not an agreement to arbitrate
disputes.91
Three factors should be considered when determining whether to
grant a motion to compel arbitration: “(1) whether a valid arbitration
agreement exists; (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the
agreement; and (3) whether applicable contract principles subject the
agreement to revocation.”92 Although the trial court never resolved the
first factor, whether the dispute resolution provision constituted an
arbitration agreement, appellate courts do not need to agree with the trial
court’s reasoning in order to affirm.93
Even though courts look favorably upon enforcing agreements to
arbitrate disputes, the instant court held courts do not have to find and
enforce an arbitration agreement if the parties have not agreed to it in their
contract.94 Therefore, the Utility Company bore the burden of proving a
valid and enforceable contract to arbitrate disputes existed.95 The Utility
Id.
Id.
93
Id. at 827 n.5. Appellate “courts are ‘concerned primarily with reaching a correct
result, and thus . . . do not need to agree with the reasoning of the trial court in order to
affirm.’” Id. (quoting McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996)).
94
Id. at 827-28.
95
Id.
91
92
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Company argued arbitration agreements do not specifically need to use the
word “arbitrate” to come within the FAA’s coverage.96 The instant court
agreed with the Utility Company but narrowed the Utility Company’s
argument, holding not every dispute resolution provision constitutes an
agreement to arbitrate.97 In other words, only some dispute resolution
provisions are arbitration agreements. Furthermore, the court declined to
accept the Utility Company’s argument that all dispute resolution
provisions constitute arbitration agreements.98 The dispute resolution
provision in Sharp is an example of a dispute resolution provision that is
not an arbitration agreement.99 Nevertheless, the court agreed all
arbitration agreements constitute dispute resolution provisions.100
Dispute resolution includes negotiation, mediation, litigation, and
arbitration.101 The parties’ dispute resolution provision “provides for
‘dispute resolution’ in the form of either ‘an informal or formal
complaint’” to be brought to the Commission.102 The provision identifies
Id.
Id.
98
Id. at 827-28.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 827.
101
Id. at 828.
102
Id.
96
97
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the regulation103 governing the complaint filing procedure.104 The court
declined to accept the Utility Company’s argument that the reference to
the regulation was a procedural mechanism for the parties to commence
arbitration.105 The formal and informal complaint process did not
constitute arbitration.106 Even if the court accepted the Utility Company’s
argument, the Utility Company still did not demonstrate the necessary
prerequisites to invoke the Commission’s authority under the dispute
resolution provision because the Utility Company failed to file a formal or
informal complaint.107
Of course, the court notes the consumers would have been the ones
filing a complaint in front of the Commission, not the Utility Company.108
This reasoning solidifies the court’s determination that the dispute
resolution provision was never intended to be an arbitration agreement.109
If the Commission had intended the dispute resolution provision to be an

103
MO. CODE REGS. ANN., tit. 4 § 240-2.070(1) (2016) (providing “any person or public
utility who feels aggrieved by an alleged violation of any tariff, statute, rule, order, or
decision within the commission’s jurisdiction may file a complaint”).
104
Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 828.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 830 n.6.
109
Id.
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arbitration agreement, the Utility Company would not need to file a
complaint in front of the Commission and move to compel arbitration
because usually a party will do one or the other but not both.110
Additionally, the Commission drafted the dispute resolution
provision, and “the provision contains no reference whatsoever to . . . the
sole authority”111 allowing the Commission to act as arbitrators.112 The
court’s finding suggests the Commission did not intend the dispute
resolution provision to include arbitration for controversies arising out of
net-metering agreements.113 Further, the court cannot see how a non-party
to a contract could “ever bind parties to mandatory arbitration.”114
In addition, statutory prerequisites must be fulfilled before the
Commission can exercise its limited jurisdiction.115 The Commission’s
authority to act as arbitrators is limited to controversies between public
utilities or between public utilities and persons, only where “all the parties
Id.
E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 386.230 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (providing “Whenever any public
utility has a controversy with another public utility or person and all the parties . . . agree
in writing to submit such controversy to the [C]ommission as arbitrators, the
[C]ommission shall act as . . . arbitrators . . . and . . . hear such controversy, and their
award shall be final”).
112
Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 828.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 830 n.8.
115
Id. at 828-29.
110
111
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. . . agree in writing to submit such controversy to the [C]ommission as
arbitrators.”116 Here, the statutory prerequisites for the Commission to act
as arbitrators were not met.117 The consumers did not agree in writing to
submit the controversy to the Commission, and the consumers were very
opposed to arbitration before the Commission.118 Further, the statutory
language “in writing” has been interpreted to mean a post-dispute
agreement in writing.119
Because the consumers strongly opposed arbitration and the trial
court found the consumers did not sign the contracts containing the
dispute resolution provision, the Utility Company failed to show the
parties agreed in writing to submit the controversy to the Commission as
arbitrators.120 Therefore, the Utility Company failed to invoke the
Commission’s arbitration authority under § 386.230.121 Thus, the Utility
Company failed to demonstrate a valid and enforceable contract to

MO. REV. STAT. § 386.230 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 829.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
116
117
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arbitrate.122 Lastly, the court affirmed the trial court’s overruling of the
Utility Company’s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.123
V. COMMENT
Agency capture is the process by which policy is directed away
from public interest and toward a regulated industry’s interests. 124 Here,
capture would potentially occur if the Commission were to become
directed more toward the utility industry’s interests than public interest.
Capture is a structural problem which occurs sometimes, allowing some
industry interests to systematically win out over others.125 In Sharp, it is
not apparent the utility industry’s interests systematically won out over
public interest, and the Commission itself may have even determined it
could not construe the contract, as the Commission did in Shawnee.
However, influencing policy is not identical to capturing a
regulatory agency.126 Of course, capture is often context-dependent, but
capture may be weak or strong. Strong capture is the idea that interest
groups’ solicitations are so pervasive and socially costly that no regulation
Id. at 830.
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124
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125
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at all might be better.127 Therefore, in some instances, it might be better to
get rid of entire departments or agencies if public interest is not being
served.128 Strong capture is not a problem which arises between the
Commission and the utility industry. Weak capture is when regulation
discarded in the administrative process is less publically interested than it
should be but is still on balance for enhancing social welfare. 129 However,
sometimes it might be better to change agency design to tweak
institutional structure.130 Perhaps it would be better to modify the
Commission’s authority to interpret net-metering disputes because those
contracts are highly technical, and the Commission has specialized
knowledge relevant to utilities that judges do not.
As mentioned, context matters.131 Agency rulemaking is far more
insulated from capture than other types of administrative action. 132 Here,
the Commission made the rule that the form the Utility Company used in
its rebate program had to be “substantially the same” as the Commission’s
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form.133 The Commission’s rule is not patently unfair to either party, and
may actually serve public interest because sometimes arbitrators make a
pattern of treating one side more favorably. So, if the Utility Company
were allowed to draft its own form, the Utility Company may have drafted
a form for mandatory arbitration with an arbitrator of its choosing. If the
Commission’s rule allowed that hypothetical situation to take place, then
its rule would not be serving public interest.
Administrative systems are designed so capture does not occur.
“Although public interest groups generally have less influence with an
agency than industrial groups do . . . today it is rare to find an agency
serving only a regulated industry’s interests.”134 Professor Engstrom, an
Associate Professor at Stanford Law School who specializes in topics in
administrative law,135 thinks capture is not as worrisome as micro-levels
of agency decision-making.136
Nevertheless, if capture is a concern, one option is to cut agencies
out of the process entirely by having legislature write more detailed
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laws.137 Of course, there are downsides to this because the Commission is
supposed to have specialized knowledge that the legislature would not
have.138 Additionally, there is an argument to be made that legislative
subcommittees are just as susceptible to political influence as
administrative agencies and would be just as likely to reflect public
interest.139 Another alternative would be to give courts broad interpretive
law-making authority.140
Judicial review can be an important part of the administrative
system.141 Courts should be wary of players that may or appear to be
developing a close relationship, especially when one of those players is
part of the government.142 In Sharp, it is noteworthy the appellate court
has different reasoning for the decision at bar because the court could have
decided this case exclusively with contract principals, and it hints at some
broader policy reasons than the trial court did.143 Courts, including the
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Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri, are usually careful
to avoid having agencies decide anything outside of those agencies’
limited specialized knowledge. Courts have an interest in limiting agencies
to the powers statutes confer upon them, so courts will try to infer
legislative intent when determining what powers agencies have. Based on
judicial interpretation, Missouri legislature only intended the Commission
have a fairly limited scope of power.144
Agencies are scrutinized closely because of skepticism related to
capture, and Professor Engstrom says capture may be a “self-fulfilling
prophecy.”145 So, here the problem might not be with the Commission
itself, but with the idea that agencies like the Commission are susceptible
to outside influence.146 Of course, the judiciary has an interest in
determining the statute’s meaning, and precedent dictates the Commission
cannot construe contracts, although it can sometimes act as an
arbitrator.147
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Sharp reaffirms the Commission has limited authority, and the
Commission does not have the power to interpret contracts. 148 The
Commission’s rule the agreement had to be “substantially the same” as the
Commission’s form seems fair because contract drafters are the “masters”
of the deal, and it would be unfair to give that benefit to one party.
However, in this context, the Commission probably has more specialized
knowledge of utility systems and net metering than most judges do. The
decision in Sharp means future disputes about net-metering agreements
could go either way, depending on how that particular judge construes the
contract.
Nevertheless, here it is difficult to trace the source of the
Agreement’s unclarity. Should the Commission have chosen different
terms for its form agreement, or should the legislature have written a more
specific statute? Litigation is more expensive than dispute resolution,149 so
this oversight will impact any parties to future net-metering disputes
because they too will not be able to arbitrate before the Commission. Of
course, in net-metering agreement disputes, one party will certainly be a
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utility company, which means utility companies will have to litigate netmetering disputes in the future. Here, the legal framework did not leave
room for any other decision unless the appellate court were to carve out an
exception for net-metering form agreements, but that decision might
increase fears of agency capture. However, the appellate court’s broader
reasoning than the trial court’s reasoning may have been unnecessary.
Any future disputes over net-metering agreements in the Western
District, and likely even other parts of Missouri, must therefore encounter
litigation costs, which could add up to hundreds of thousands or even
millions of dollars.150 Litigation costs for class actions may be so high as
to induce settlement by the defendant.151 When defendant corporations
have high costs, usually the shareholders incur those costs,152 which is
why some shareholders prefer mandatory arbitration to litigation.153 So,
the Missouri Court of Appeals of the Western District’s decision in Sharp
will affect Kansas City Power & Light shareholders and other
shareholders of Missouri utility companies as well in the future.
Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL. J.
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151
Id. at 796-97.
152
Id. at 812.
153
Id. at 794.
150

245

VI. CONCLUSION
If the Sharp decision is to be predictive of future disputes arising
out of net-metering agreements between a utility company and its
consumer, courts will be very careful to limit agency power to what is
conferred to the agency in the statute. Additionally, courts will be very
careful in construing the parties’ intent as expressed in the parties’ netmetering agreement contract. When parties must litigate their disputes,
they almost certainly incur higher costs compared to alternative dispute
resolution. Higher costs for utility companies because of litigation arising
out of net-metering agreements could mean additional costs will be passed
on to the company’s shareholders. Perhaps utility companies will
eventually lobby their interests against net-metering agreements, although
it is difficult to say if the Commission would ever replace net-metering
agreements with something else.
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